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ABSTRACT 
In The Concept of Law – which continues to enjoy the central position in 
the field of analytical jurisprudence five decades after its initial publication 
– H.L.A. Hart makes two powerful claims.  He argues that his theory of law 
is universal (in that it can apply to any legal culture) and timeless (in that 
it can apply to different times in history).  Despite the sweeping, bold nature 
of these claims, neither Hart nor the large body of scholarship that has 
responded to, criticized, and refined Hart’s model of law over the past few 
decades has really tested whether Hart’s geographic and temporal claims 
are true.  Hoping to correct this scholarly deficit, this Article attempts to 
internationalize and historicize Hart’s theory of law by applying it to the 
Chinese legal tradition – a non-Western, secular, and largely homegrown 
legal tradition that remained free from Western influence and enjoyed 
remarkable continuity for approximately 1,500 years.  Through using 
specific legislative and judicial debates from the Chinese legal tradition as 
a testing ground for Hart’s theory (rather than simply focusing on Chinese 
premodern codes and statutes, which cannot illuminate law in practice), 
this Article argues that Hart’s theory of law – namely, his signature concept 
of the rule of recognition – can be said to be generally applicable to the 
Chinese legal tradition, and hence has stronger claims to being universal 
and timeless.  However, when applied to the Chinese legal tradition, Hart’s 
model of law makes certain incorrect, Western-centric assumptions 
regarding the function of the rule of recognition in a legal system, namely, 
his argument that the rule of recognition solves the deficiency of uncertainty 
in the primary rules.  Put another way, although Hart claims his theory of 
law is descriptive and morally neutral, it may nevertheless contain certain 
Western-centric normative assumptions.  This problem is not, however, 
fatal to the general applicability of Hart’s model of law to the Chinese legal 
tradition, but acknowledgement of such a problem can help legal theorists 
put forth a truly general “general jurisprudence.” 
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INTRODUCTION  
In the Postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart makes two bold 
claims regarding his theory of law.  One claim is a claim to universality, and 
the other is a claim to timelessness: 
 
My aim in this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is 
both general and descriptive.  It is general in the sense that it is not 
tied to any particular legal system or legal culture, but seeks to give 
an explanatory and clarifying account of law as a complex social 
and political institution with a rule-governed . . . aspect.  This 
institution, in spite of many variations in different cultures and in 
different times, has taken the same general form and structure . . . .1 
 
In other words, Hart argues that his theory of law is universal in that it is a 
general theory of law that can apply to any legal culture.  Indeed, to press 
this point, Hart contrasts his approach with the “radically different” theory 
of his major critic, Ronald Dworkin, arguing that Dworkin’s theory was 
“addressed to Anglo-American legal culture” and thus was an example of 
particular, not general, jurisprudence.2  In addition, Hart argues that his 
 
 
1 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 239-240 (3d ed. 2012). 
2 Id.  Brian Leiter also describes Hart as having done “general jurisprudence” in contrast to 
Dworkin’s “particular jurisprudence” of Anglo-American legal systems.  Leiter argues that Hart was 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/6
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model of law is timeless in the sense that it can be generally applied not only 
to different cultures, but to different historical periods (in Hart’s words as 
quoted in the excerpt above, “different times”). Put another way, Hart is 
making claims regarding the broad geographical and temporal scope and 
applicability of his theory of law. 
 Despite the significance of these claims, Hart did not adequately 
provide empirical, real-world examples to test and verify such claims.  As 
William Twining has argued, Hart treated law as a “social phenomenon,” 
but he did not engage deeply with social theory or “law in action.”3  
Fernanda Pirie has also pointed out Hart’s lack of anthropological examples 
when he discussed legal rules in simple, primitive societies.4  The few 
examples Hart provided in The Concept of Law are almost exclusively 
limited to Anglo-American law or European law (or legal systems based in 
large part on European law) more generally.5 Hart himself seemed to 
suggest that his idea of the municipal legal system which dominates his 
theory of law might not shed light on other varieties of law or different legal 
traditions in the past.6  
To determine whether Hart’s theory of law is truly as universal and 
timeless as he claimed, Hart’s theory of law should be applied to non-
Western as well as premodern legal cultures.  In other words, it is important 
to draw on non-Western law, non-Western legal traditions, and legal history 
more generally to prove, disprove, or at least complicate Hart’s theory of 
law.  Indeed, some legal theorists have recognized the need for such a 
scholarly exercise.  Michael Lobban has pointed out that Hart’s theory of 
law is founded upon many assumptions about empirical behavior, and 
therefore it is imperative that we look at empirical and historical evidence 
to test the theory’s validity.7  More specifically, if a theory (like Hart’s) 
 
 
correct to say that Dworkin’s project is “radically different” because Dworkin takes a particular legal 
culture – the Anglo-American legal culture – as his “central concern.”  BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 159 
(2007).  
3 WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 11 (2009).   
4 FERNANDA PIRIE, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 20 (2013).   
5 For example, Hart brings up examples from English law, U.S. law, South African law, and Soviet 
Russia.  See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, at 25 (using the example of the Soviet legislature); id. at 28 (using 
the example of the English Wills Act); id at 73 (using the example of South Africa’s Act of 1909); id. at 
204 (using the example of the U.S. legal system).   
6 Makysmilian Del Mar, Beyond Universality and Particularity, Necessity, and Contingency: On 
Collaboration Between Legal Theory and Legal History, in LAW IN THEORY AND HISTORY: NEW 
ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 22, 27 (Makysmilian Del Mar & Michael Lobban eds., 2016). 
7 Michael Lobban, Legal Theory and Legal History: Prospects for Dialogue, in LAW IN THEORY 
AND HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 3, 7 (Makysmilian Del Mar & Michael 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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claims to be a timeless and universal explanation of law, then history can 
provide examples and data to test whether those claims are true.8  On the 
importance of consulting and engaging with non-Western legal traditions in 
legal theory, David Gerber has bluntly pointed out that: 
 
To generalize about law on the basis of experience with a single 
system is a common enough form of entertainment (particularly in 
the U.S.) but hardly of great analytical value.  Only when 
theoretical propositions can be tested in more than one legal system 
can they legitimately claim any degree of validity, and the more 
often they are used and the more rigorously and successfully they 
are tested, the stronger those legitimacy claims become.9 
 
William Twining has decried what he sees as ethnocentrism and Western 
biases in legal theory scholarship and urged legal theorists to “pay more 
attention to other legal traditions,”10 to “take more account of non-Western 
legal traditions,”11 and, when claiming universality or generality, to be 
cautious if such claims “are based on familiarity with only one legal 
tradition.”12 
 Despite such calls and the truly vast amount of literature that Hart’s 
theory of law has engendered, there has been little scholarly work using 
examples from non-Western legal history or a non-Western legal tradition 
to specifically test whether Hart’s universality and timelessness claims 
regarding his model of law are true.13  Indeed, as Twining has pointed out, 
 
 
Lobban eds., 2016).   
8 Id. at 16.   
9 David Gerber, Towards a Language of Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 719, 734 (1998).  
This passage is also quoted in John Bell, Is Comparative Law Necessary for Legal Theory, in LAW IN 
THEORY AND HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 127, 127 (Makysmilian Del Mar & 
Michael Lobban eds., 2016).   I thank Bell for directing me to Gerber’s article.   
10 TWINING, supra note 3, at xiii.   
11 Id. at 65. 
12 Id. at xix.   
13 There are some studies that come close to doing this.  See, e.g.,  Peri Bearman, Introduction: 
The Nature of Sharia, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1, 6 (Rudolph Peters 
& Peri Bearman eds., 2016) (attempting, in a few sentences, to lay out what the rule of recognition might 
be in Sharia law, but not systematically and critically applying Hart’s theory to Islamic law); PIRIE, 
supra note 4, at 107-112 (arguing that the Chinese tradition evokes a different vision of law – that is, an 
appeal to tradition, but does not explicitly test Hart’s views and rather is more focused on law and 
anthropology); Raymond Wacks, One Country, Two Groundnormen?  The Basic Law and the Basic 
Norm, in HONG KONG, CHINA, AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 151, 151-184 (Raymond Wacks 
ed., 1993) (applying Hart’s rule of recognition concept to Hong Kong’s legal transition from British rule 
to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and expressing doubt that positivist accounts of law can explain this 
legal transition; however, Wacks focuses on Hong Kong, whose legal system was and still is based 
primarily on the English law system); and Jean-Louis Halperin, The Concept of Law: A Western 
Transplant?, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 333-354 (2009) (arguing that Hart’s definition of law 
as a union of primary rules and secondary rules does fit the Chinese legal tradition but does not delve 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/6
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even those Anglo-American legal theorists who claim they are doing 
general jurisprudence “work exclusively in the Western legal tradition” and 
“pay little or no attention to . . . non-Western cultures and traditions.”14  
Given that Hart’s model of law continues to remain “the center for nearly 
all contemporary work in analytic jurisprudence”15 and retains its position 
as “the font of all serious philosophical work about the nature of law,”16 it 
is important that we address this scholarly deficit.  The validation of Hart’s 
theory (or its complication or invalidation) by such examples can breathe 
new life and offer new research areas and inform the legal theory and legal 
philosophy fields as a whole, especially since Hart has “set the context, 
terminology, and structure of the central debates in jurisprudence over the 
last fifty years,” and the great majority of key contributions to legal theory 
over the past half-century have been attempted rejections, complications, 
refinements, modifications, or clarifications of Hart’s theory of law.17 
 In this Article, I attempt to internationalize and historicize Hart’s 
model of law by applying it to a non-Western legal tradition – the Chinese 
legal tradition.18  The Chinese legal tradition and Chinese legal history is 
vast, and so I shall focus my attention on the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–220 
A.D.) and the transition period from the Han dynasty up to the Tang dynasty 
(Tang: 618 A.D.–907 A.D.).  The Chinese legal tradition was strongly 
influenced by Confucianism, which became the state ideological orthodoxy 
in the Han dynasty.  Furthermore, between the Han and the Tang dynasties, 
 
 
deeply into historical sources and relies mostly on generalizations of Chinese legal history, ultimately 
making an ethnocentric argument that the Chinese legal tradition, inter alia, was not as “successful” as 
the Roman legal tradition). 
14 TWINING, supra note 3, at 11.   
15 Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma, Introduction to THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION xiii, xiii (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
16 Id. 
17 Brian H. Bix, Legal Positivism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 29, 32 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2004). 
18 The Chinese legal tradition is a vast and complex tradition with various, diverse strands, and 
some generalization will be required.  However, such generalizations are arguably in many ways 
historically accurate.  As Geoffrey MacCormack has pointed out, the Chinese legal tradition from the 
second century B.C. until the early 20th century (with the collapse of the last imperial dynasty, the Qing 
dynasty), had remarkable continuity (a “remarkable feature [of the Chinese legal tradition] . . . is that a 
core group of legal provisions survived many centuries of development with little change.”  GEOFFREY 
MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 2 (1996).  In this Article, I will not rely 
simply on codes and statutes, which I believe do not present an accurate picture of law in practice, but 
rather utilize more revealing, actual case records, as well as legislative and judicial debates to highlight 
aspects of the Chinese legal tradition.  By “Chinese legal tradition,” I generally use Robert Heuser’s 
definition, with some modifications – it should be understood as the “sum of all moral concepts, legal 
and other norms, institutions, procedural rules, and behavior patterns in Chinese society from antiquity 
to 1911, the fall of the last imperial Chinese dynasty.”  See Robert Heuser, Legal Tradition, in BRILL’S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA 562, 562 (Daniel Leese ed., 2008).   
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the process of “Confucianization of law” occurred, which strongly shaped 
dynastic Chinese law until 1911.19  Hence, the Han dynasty, as well as the 
dynasties immediately after the Han and before the Tang, are not only 
significant in and of themselves, but also have representative value for the 
Chinese legal tradition, which enjoyed remarkable continuity for 2,000 
years.  I also use specific examples of cases and judicial and legislative 
debates from premodern Chinese legal history to test the validity of key 
parts of Hart’s model of law. As sole reliance on premodern Chinese statutes 
and codes cannot reveal anything significant about official behavior, I 
analyze  certain cases and debates in Chinese legal history to illuminate law 
in practice and the behavior of officials, both of which Hart was concerned 
about. Given that Hart’s model of law is complex, this article will focus on 
testing Hart’s famous concept of the rule of recognition. The rule of 
recognition has been summarized as “the rule that is used to identify those 
other rules that are valid in a given legal system”.20 In other words, the rule 
of recognition is the test of what constitutes law in a legal system21 and, for 
Hart, is a component of what constitutes a “developed” legal system.22  The 
rule of recognition is also a good candidate for testing and application, given 
that it is “such a central component of modern positivist jurisprudence”23 
and a “key feature of modern jurisprudence” more generally.24 
This Article’s overall argument is that Hart’s model of law is generally 
applicable to the Chinese legal tradition, and hence has strong claims to 
being universal and timeless.  Nevertheless, when applied to the Chinese 
legal tradition, Hart’s model of law makes some incorrect assumptions 
regarding the function of certain rules in society.  While these problems are 
not fatal to the applicability of Hart’s model of law to the Chinese legal 
tradition, bringing attention to them can inform legal theorists of how to 
 
 
19 The phrase “Confucianization of law” was first coined by Chinese legal historian T’ung-tsu 
Ch’ü; see T’UNG-TSU CH’Ü, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1961).  I am grateful to Paul 
Goldin for this point; see Paul Goldin, Han Law and the Regulation of Interpersonal Relations: ‘The 
Confucianization of Law’ Revisited, 25 ASIA MAJOR 1, 2-3 (2012).  Goldin defines “Confucianization 
of law” as the “process by which the legal system, comprising not only statutes and ordinances, but also 
principles of legal interpretation and legal theorizing, came to reflect the view that the law must uphold 
proper interactions among people, in accordance with their respective relationships, in order to bring 
about an orderly society.”  Goldin, Han Law and the Regulation of Interpersonal Relations: ‘The 
Confucianization of Law’ Revisited, 25 ASIA MAJOR 1, 6 (2012).  For a scholarly reassessment of the 
“Confucianization of law” label and narrative, see Geoffrey MacCormack, A Reassessment of 
“Confucianization of the Law” from the Han to the T’ang, in ZHONGGUO SHI XINLUN: FALÜSHI FENCE 
[NEW DISCUSSIONS ON CHINESE HISTORY: LEGAL HISTORY] 397, 397-442 (Liu Liyan ed., 2008).  
20 Stephen V. Carey, Comment, What is the Rule of Recognition in the United States?  157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2009). 
21 See HART, supra note 1, at 107-108. 
22 See id. at 95.   
23 Jeremy Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Recognition?, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 327, 327 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
24 Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/6
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take a more non-Western-centered and more general approach to 
jurisprudence.     
More specifically, this Article makes the following two arguments: 
first, Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition can be applied in the Chinese 
legal tradition.  Second, the Chinese legal tradition reveals deficiencies in 
Hart’s contention that the rule of recognition serves to solve the problem of 
uncertainty of primary rules.25  In the formative years of the Chinese legal 
tradition and the Confucian tradition more generally, uncertainty in the 
primary rules, and indeed in the law, was seen as a positive characteristic in 
governing society. Therefore, Hart’s explanation of the key function of the 
rule of recognition as a means of solving problems of uncertainty in the 
primary rules may not be correct and may be animated by a Western-centric 
normative assumption that certainty in legal rules is good. This is not fatal 
to the applicability of the concept of the rule of recognition itself, but is 
merely a critique of the applicability of every facet of Hart’s conception of 
the rule of recognition to international and historical legal regimes.  In short, 
this Article can be read as an internationalized and historicized defense of 
Hart. 
 Some remarks regarding methodology may be in order before delving 
into the body of the Article.  Why use the Chinese legal tradition and 
premodern Chinese legal history as a bar to test Hart’s model of law? First, 
China has a long legal tradition that developed (at least prior to the entry of 
Western imperialism in the 19th century) independent from Western law 
and other influences.  It was also extremely influential on the development 
of other legal systems and legal traditions in Asia. For example, the Tang 
Code of 653 A.D. was used as the model for similar legal codes in Japan, 
Korea, and Vietnam.26  In the periods I refer to in this Article, the legal 
system in China was sophisticated and developed, with a complex 
government bureaucracy staffed with officials which handled not only legal 
disputes but also other political and administrative matters.  In this sense, 
given the long history and influence of the Chinese legal tradition, it 
arguably has greater relevance as a testing ground because it can be said to 
be representative of the East Asian legal tradition more broadly. 
 This Article proceeds as follows:  In Section I, I begin with an 
analytical overview of Hart’s rule of recognition.  In Section II, I use the 
Chinese legal tradition to test aspects of Hart’s concept of rule of 
recognition. Here I will set forth my aforementioned specific arguments, 
 
 
25 HART, supra note 1, at 94.   
26 THE T’ANG CODE, VOLUME 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 9 (Wallace Johnson trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press 1979). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
190 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 10:183 
 
 
situating them in the existing, broader scholarly debates regarding Hart’s 
rule of recognition. The Article then concludes with some suggestions of 
how the Chinese legal tradition might contribute to setting forth a truly 
general “general jurisprudence” and to putting forward a more culturally-
nuanced understanding of the concept of law.   
 It should be made clear what this Article is not.  This Article is not 
primarily concerned with purely abstract, theoretical debates of key 
concepts in Hart’s model of law, e.g., whether the rule of recognition is 
power-conferring, duty-imposing, or both, whether a rule of recognition is 
even necessary, or whether inclusive or exclusive positivism is right.  There 
is a huge existing theoretical literature that has addressed such questions, 
and as I will explain later, my interpretation of Hart is informed by 
secondary scholarship, particularly the views of Matthew Kramer.27  
Instead, this Article should be understood primarily as a work in applied 
legal theory.   
 It is hoped that this Article is of interest to legal theorists working in 
analytical jurisprudence and general jurisprudence, and also legal historians 
of China by providing both a further analytical framework for understanding 
the structures of traditional Chinese law, as well as translations of some 
primary sources in Chinese legal history that have never previously been 
translated into English.  In the end, the ultimate scholarly aim of this Article 
is threefold: to promote more dialogue between non-Western and Western 
legal traditions, to bring non-Western legal traditions into the “mainstream” 
legal theory field and to show how such traditions can directly inform 
existing, important debates in jurisprudence (as opposed to simply being 
exoticized, orientalized, and marginalized28), and, in response to calls for 
more dialogue between the fields of legal theory and legal history, to be a 
specific, actual example of the fruitful discoveries that can result from such 
dialogue.29 
  
I.  HART’S RULE OF RECOGNITION AND ITS FUNCTION IN HART’S 
MODEL OF LAW  
This first section begins with a brief analytical overview of the rule of 
recognition and situates it within Hart’s general model of law, which will 
 
 
27 See, e.g., MATTHEW KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY MEET (2008); Matthew Kramer, In 
Defense of Hart, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 22, 22-50 (Wil 
Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2013). 
28 See TWINING, supra note 3, at 45-46. 
29 See, e.g., Brian Tamanaha, How History Bears on Jurisprudence, in LAW IN THEORY AND 
HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 329, 330, 338 (Makysmilian Del Mar & Michael 
Lobban eds., 2016) (arguing that “much of modern legal philosophy or analytical jurisprudence ignores 
history” and that legal philosophy should be more historical in approach). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/6
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serve as a basis of discussion and application in all later sections of the 
Article.  First, Hart considers law a system of rules.  He makes a distinction 
between two types of rules: primary rules and secondary rules.  Primary 
rules are duty-imposing rules of obligation whereby “human beings are 
required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not.”30  
Examples may be rules which prohibit murder, theft, or prostitution, or rules 
which require a subject to pay tribute every month to the king.  Secondary 
rules “provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things 
introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or 
in various ways determine their incidence or control their operations.”31  In 
other words, secondary rules are rules about the primary rules; they are 
“concerned with the primary rules themselves.”32  As opposed to the 
primary rules, which simply prohibit or require certain behavior or actions, 
secondary rules identify and “specify the ways in which the primary rules 
may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the 
fact of their violation conclusively determined.”33  Secondary rules may 
include, for instance, a constitutional requirement that a certain majority of 
lawmakers vote in favor of a new law or that parties entering into a contract 
be legal adults.  
Hart argues that so-called “primitive societies”34 are governed only by 
primary rules.35  Put another way, for Hart, a legal system is considered 
“primitive” if it consists only of primary rules.36 Communities “closely knit 
by ties of kinship, common sentiment, and belief”37 and “in a stable 
environment”38 can be governed and “live successfully”39 under a system 
only of primary rules.  However, as society becomes more complex or in 
communities which do not enjoy such social or environmental homogeneity, 
sole reliance on primary rules exposes their three major shortcomings: their 
uncertainty (i.e., there are no set procedures or methods for interpreting a 
primary rule, determining its scope, or identifying what is or is not a primary 
rule),40 their static character (i.e., there are no set procedures or methods for 
 
 
30 HART, supra note 1, at 81.   
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 94. 
33 Id. 
34 Hart does not give a real-world or historical example of what he means by a “primitive 
communit[y].”  Id. at 91. 
35 Id.  
36 Carey, supra note 20, at 1166 n.21.   
37 HART, supra note 1, at 92. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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changing, eliminating, and/or altering existing rules or introducing new 
ones, other than relying on the “slow process of growth”41),42 and their 
inefficiency (i.e., there are no set procedures or methods for resolving 
disputes involving a primary rule or determining remedies and 
punishments).43   
For Hart, the secondary rules solve these three defects.  Specifically, 
Hart lays out three types of secondary rules: rules of change, rules of 
adjudication, and rules of recognition. Rules of change solve the static 
problem by setting forth the procedure or methods for abolishing, 
modifying, or creating primary rules.44 Rules of adjudication solve the 
inefficiency problem by setting forth the procedure or methods for 
adjudicating primary rules. For example, rules of adjudication may establish 
how punishments or remedies should be determined or how disputes 
regarding primary rules should be resolved.45 The rule of recognition solves 
the problem of uncertainty by specifying “some feature or features 
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as conclusive affirmative 
indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure 
it exerts.”46  Put more simply, the rule of recognition “provides the ultimate 
criterion for verifying the validity of laws.”47  It helps us to determine 
whether a given rule is indeed a valid law. As Hart wrote, “[t]o say that a 
given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the 
rule of recognition and so as a rule of the system.”48 The rule of recognition 
is, in other words, the ultimate and supreme rule because it itself is not 
subject to another test for its own validity nor draws its existence from 
another rule.49 
The combination of primary and secondary rules is significant in Hart’s 
model because a legal system exists in a society if its “private citizens” 
generally obey the society’s primary rules (which are themselves confirmed 
as valid law by the rule of recognition) and officials must accept the 
secondary rules – the rule of recognition, the rules of change, and rules of 
adjudication – as “common public standards of official behavior by its 
officials.”50  In particular, officials must accept the rule of recognition in the 
internal point of view. Therefore, for a legal system to exist, the rule of 
 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 92-93.   
43 Id. at 93.  See also J.E. PENNER & E. MELISSARIS, MCCOUBREY & WHITE’S TEXTBOOK ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 71 (5th ed. 2012). 
44 HART, supra note 1, at 96.   
45 Id. at 97. 
46 Id. at 94. 
47 SURI RATNAPALA, JURISPRUDENCE 52 (2009). 
48 HART, supra note 1, at 103.  See also Carey, supra note 20, at 1167. 
49 Carey, supra note 20, at 1167. 
50 HART, supra note 1, at 116.   
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recognition must be accepted by officials as binding, officials must “accept 
the rule of recognition as binding, act consistently with its requirements, 
criticize officials who deviate from it, and accept such criticism as 
legitimate.”51  Indeed, for Hart, a society transitions from “primitive” to 
possessing a “fully developed” legal system when it does not only possess 
primary rules, but also secondary rules.52  Some commentators have pointed 
out that Hart suggests that “primitive” communities, which lack developed 
secondary rules, are in fact “pre-legal” communities, since they do not have 
the “institutional base and rules necessary for a recognizable ‘legal 
system’.”53  Hart seems to also suggest that primitive communities do not 
have a legal system, but just a “mere set” of rules.54 
Having provided a brief overview of the rule of recognition and its 
place in Hart’s model of law, we can make some additional, more specific 
points and emphasize the rule of recognition’s characteristics and content.  
The rule of recognition has a necessity aspect.  In Hart’s view, the rule of 
recognition is necessary for a legal system.55  There is also a singular or 
unitive aspect to the rule of recognition: Every legal system contains only 
one single, ultimate overarching rule of recognition that sets out the test of 
validity for that particular system.56  The rule of recognition is also a social 
 
 
51 Adler & Himma, Introduction, supra note 15, at xiv.   
52 Carey, supra note 20, at 1166. 
53 Penner & Melissaris, supra note 43, at 72.  See HART, supra note 1, at 117 (writing that a social 
structure which consists of only primary rules is decentralized and “pre-legal”). 
54 See HART, supra note 1, at 234; NICHOLAS J. MCBRIDE & SANDY STEEL, GREAT DEBATES IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 37 (2014). 
55 See HART, supra note 1, at 100 (writing that there are certain truths about certain aspects of law, 
and that “[t]hese truths can, however, only be clearly presented, and their importance rightly assessed, 
in terms of the more complex social situation when a secondary rule of recognition is accepted and used 
for the identification of primary rules of obligation.  It is this situation which deserves, if anything does, 
to be called the foundations of the legal system.”).  See also MCBRIDE & STEEL, supra note 54, at 36.   
56 HART, supra note 1, at 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 149, 292.  Many thanks 
to Grant Lamond for pointing out these citations. See Grant Lamond, Legal Sources, the Rule of 
Recognition, and Customary Law, 59 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 28 (2014)  See also KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND 
MORALITY, supra note 27, at 105 and Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Rule of Recognition (And Does It 
Exist)?, in LAW IN THEORY AND HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 235, 238 
(Makysmilian Del Mar & Michael Lobban eds., 2016). It should be noted here that there is a scholarly 
theoretical debate on the level of inclusivity of the rule of recognition, and more specifically, whether a 
legal system has only single rule of recognition or if there are many. The debate results in part due to 
the fact that Hart usually spoke of one rule of recognition, but sometimes used the term “rules” (plural) 
of recognition.  See HART, supra note 1, at 95 (writing “[i]n a developed legal system the rules of 
recognition are of course more complex), 96 (writing that “[u]sually some official certificate or official 
copy will, under the rules of recognition, be taken as sufficient proof of due enactment), 102 (writing 
that “[t]he use of unstated rules of recognition, by courts, and others, in identifying particular rules of 
the system is characteristic of the internal point of view”), and 104 (writing “its [a legal system’s] rules 
of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be 
effectively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials”).  See also Giorgio 
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rule because its existence and content is determined by certain social facts, 
i.e., the presence and content of the rule of recognition is shown through the 
behavior of that society’s officials and their acceptance of the rule of 
recognition.57   
In addition, in providing the criteria for legal validity, the single, 
ultimate rule of recognition also sets out “orders of precedence among 
sources of law.”58  This is especially important in more complex legal 
systems that possess multiple sources of law, such as a constitution, 
legislative acts, and case law precedents.59  In such systems with many 
sources of law, it is entirely possible, and common, that officials may have 
some disagreement on some specific elements or criteria of the rule of 
recognition that lies at the base of the legal system.60  This is because that 
the system itself is complex, with many sources of law, but also because the 
rule of recognition is fundamentally itself also a rule, and thus subject to the 
“open texture” language issues that all rules must deal with – i.e., the rule 
of recognition may have a degree of uncertainty and may not necessarily 
provide a clear, determinate answer to all possible controversies 
surrounding primary rules.61  In such a system, the rule of recognition will 
provide “for possible conflict by ranking these criteria in an order of relative 
subordination and primacy.”62  The fact that there is such disagreement or 
divergence is compatible with Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition, “so 
long as the points of contention among them concern the less important 
layers of their rule of recognition.”63   
 
 
Pino, Farewell to the Rule of Recognition?, 5 ANUARIO DE FILOSFIA Y TEORIA DEL DERECHO 265, 272 
(2011).  Most notably, Joseph Raz and John Finnis have argued that a legal system can have multiple 
rules of recognition.  Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that in a legal system, there can be multiple 
rules of recognition, each of which sets forth an ultimate source of law; these multiples rules may be 
have no hierarchy, or each of them will set forth how it is to be ranked vs. other rules of recognition for 
determining legal validity.  See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 95-96 (1979); JOSEPH RAZ, 
THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 200 (1967).  John Finnis has also brought up the possibility of there 
being more than one rule of recognition in a legal system; see John Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity 
of Law, in OXFORD STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 44, 65-69 (Brian Simpson ed., 2d series, 1973).  Many 
thanks to Matthew Kramer and Giorgio Pino for a discussion of this debate and laying out the relevant 
sources.  See KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 27, at 106 and Giorgio Pino, Farewell 
to the Rule of Recognition?, 5 ANUARIO DE FILOSFIA Y TEORIA DEL DERECHO 265, 272 (2011).  As 
indicated in the introductory section of this Article, I am sympathetic to Matthew Kramer’s interpretation 
of Hart. 
57 HART, supra  note 1, at 116.  Shapiro, supra note 56, at 239.  See also TWINING, supra note 3, 
at 89.   
58 H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (1965) (reviewing Lon Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (1964)).  See Shapiro, supra note 56, at 238, 246 n.44.   
59 HART, supra note 1, at 95. 
60 Kramer, In Defense of Hart, supra note 27, at 26-27.   
61 HART, supra note 1, at 147-154.  Pino, supra note 56, at 273.  I thank Pino for alerting me to 
these points and the corresponding citations.   
62 HART, supra note 1, at 101.   
63 KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 27, at 105. 
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In this sense, it is helpful to think of Hart’s rule of recognition as an 
“single overarching array” of norms and standards that are ranked – some 
standards are directed to lower-level officials and require them to treat 
determinations of legal validity from higher-level officials as binding, as 
well as to criticize any fellow lower-level officials who do not adhere to the 
upper-level determinations.64  Higher-level officials may not be subject to 
the same standards of deference contained in the rule of recognition as the 
lower-level officials, but they ensure that lower-level deviations are 
corrected and punished and in so doing uphold the same ultimate rule of 
recognition.65  Or, in carrying out law-ascertaining determinations, they 
may be subject to obeying a higher norm that ties all levels of officials 
together in the rule of recognition, such as a deity, monarch, or some 
authoritative text.  The key is that these various standards are tied together 
by the rule of recognition as a “coherently interrelated set of directives,” and 
the “integratedness which it bestows upon them is what justifies our 
designating those standards and their rankings as an overarching rule of 
recognition.”66   
To give an example, a legal system run by a supreme monarch can have 
a single ultimate rule of recognition with an array of norms. At the top, you 
have the norm that “anything the monarch says or enacts, is law.”  All 
officials, whether high-ranking or low-ranking, are bound by this highest-
ranked element in the rule of recognition.  But there may be also various 
authoritative or religious texts, or precedents, that are also elements of the 
rule of recognition but that are ranked lower.  There may be different 
authoritative texts in the same ranking which lead to official disagreement 
of which text to apply in a particular case.  This disagreement may be due 
to indeterminacy within the rule of recognition itself, for as a rule, the rule 
of recognition may have “open texture” areas where there is ambiguity. But, 
all are bound at the top by the overarching rule of recognition that ties the 
determination of legal validity to the monarch’s wishes.  Matthew Kramer 
also provides a helpful analogy, comparing the overarching unity of the rule 
of recognition to a religious code of “appropriate observances” with 
different rules for different genders.67  However, even though the code’s 
precise impact on a person will be different based on the person’s gender, 
“everyone in a society can be upholding that one code.”68 
 
 
64 Kramer, In Defense of Hart, supra note 27, at 27. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 28. 
68 Id. 
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The rule of recognition is also both a power-conferring and duty-
imposing rule in that it obligates officials to treat norms which satisfy the 
rule of recognition’s criteria of validity as enjoying the exalted status of 
being a “law,”69 but is also power-conferring in the sense that it “bestows 
powers on [officials] to engage in authoritative acts of law-identification 
that can fulfill [their] obligations.”70  Finally, the rule of recognition may 
contain moral content, depending on the legal system or jurisdiction.  This 
is a key point which Hart clarified in the Postscript to The Concept of Law 
and which classifies Hart as a so-called soft, or inclusive, positivist.71  In 
other words, the rule of recognition is broader than simply issues of pedigree 
or how a primary rule has been enacted.  Hart says clearly that “[i]n some 
systems, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity 
explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral values.”72  
In the Postscript, in response to Dworkin, Hart reiterates that “the rule of 
recognition may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with 
moral principles or substantive values . . . .”73 
Thus, to summarize the above discussion, in a legal system the rule of 
recognition is a necessary, single, secondary rule that provides the ultimate 
criterion for determining whether a particular rule constitutes valid law, and 
its existence is determined by the conduct of officials, i.e., their acceptance 
of the rule of recognition.  It should be understood as a single overarching 
umbrella that can accommodate officials’ disagreement over certain 
elements, lesser criteria, or understandings of particular details of the rule 
of recognition.74  Furthermore, the specific content of a rule of recognition 
can contain moral content, such as moral values. 
 If a rule of recognition is necessary in a legal system, and if there is 
only one, ultimate rule of recognition in any legal system which provides 
the criteria for determining whether a norm should enjoy standing as true 
 
 
69 See Adler and Himma, Introduction, supra note 15, at xiv.  See also Shapiro, supra note 56, at 
240. 
70 KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 27, at 104.  It should be noted there is a 
theoretical debate in the literature whether Hart’s rule of recognition is duty-imposing, power-conferring 
or both.  I agree with Matthew Kramer’s interpretation that it is hybrid – i.e., both duty-imposing and 
power-conferring.  See Kramer, In Defense of Hart, supra note 27, at 27-28.  Some legal theorists argue 
that the rule of recognition is only duty-imposing; see, e.g., RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 
56, at 93 and NEIL MACCORMACK, H.L.A. HART 21 (1981).  Hart himself was not that clear, and wrote 
once or twice in The Concept of Law that the rule of recognition was only power-conferring.  See, e.g., 
HART, supra note 1, at 109-110.  But again, I agree with Matthew Kramer’s point that “[f]or the most 
part . . . Hart’s discussions make quite clear that any rule of recognition is both power-conferring and 
duty-imposing.”  KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 27, at 104.    I am grateful to 
Matthew Kramer for laying out this theoretical debate very clearly.  See KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND 
MORALITY, supra note 27, at 104 n.1.   
71 HART, supra note 1, at 204. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 250. 
74 See KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 27, at 106. 
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“law,” is it possible to actually articulate (in a sentence or two) what the rule 
of recognition might be in an actual, real-world legal system?  Hart gives 
some clues.  He says that a rule of recognition can be quite simple in the 
early laws of societies and be “no more than that an authoritative list or text 
of the rules is to be found in a written document or carved on some public 
monument.”75  In more complex societies, Hart describes the rule of 
recognition also as being more complex – rather than simply identifying 
rules by reference to a list or a text, they “do so by reference to some general 
characteristic possessed by the primary rules.”76  This general characteristic 
may be the fact of their enactment by a specific legislative body or their 
announcement as a rule of law by a court.77  And, in cases where there are 
multiple such general characteristics, the rule of recognition will settle any 
possible conflict (e.g., whether a legislatively enacted norm is higher than a 
norm announced as a rule by a court) “by their arrangement in an order of 
superiority, as by the common subordination of custom or precedent to 
statute, the latter being a ‘superior source’ of law.”78  Despite these clues, 
Hart was nevertheless careful to note that in some legal systems, it might 
not be possible to reduce the rule of recognition to a few stated sentences.  
Indeed, Hart warned that the rule of recognition “is very seldom expressly 
formulated as a rule”79 and that in a legal system, a rule of recognition is not 
usually stated but its existence is shown through the conduct and practice of 
the system’s officials.80   
Despite these disclaimers, Hart did try to give some real-world 
examples of what a rule of recognition might look like in certain societies.  
In the United Kingdom, Hart postulated that the rule of recognition would 
be “whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law.”81 For the U.S. legal 
system (and in other similar legal systems), Hart did not formulate a specific 
rule of recognition, but did write that “the ultimate criteria of legal validity 
might explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or 
substantive moral values, and these may form the content of legal 
constitutional restraints.”82 In a simple hereditary monarch where the only 
source of law is a monarch’s legislation, Hart posits that the rule of 
recognition would “simply specify enactment as the unique . . . criterion of 
 
 
75 HART, supra note 1, at 94. 
76 Id. at 95.   
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 101. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 102, 115, 148. 
82 Id., at 247. 
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validity of the rules” and, more specifically, in such a kingdom ruled by a 
hypothetical tyrannical King Rex I, the rule of recognition would “simply 
be that whatever Rex I enacts is law.”83  Aside from these specific, actual 
formulations, Hart fails to give more examples of what a rule of recognition 
might look like.  It should be noted that scholars have attempted to apply 
and test Hart’s rule of recognition concept to real-world legal systems 
and/or actually identity and formulate a rule of recognition for a particular 
jurisdiction, but all of these efforts have almost exclusively focused on 
Anglo-American legal systems, particularly in the contemporary era.84  This 
is yet another example of the problem identified in the beginning of this 
Article: there have been too few applications of Hart’s theory of law to non-
Western legal traditions.85 
This above section has sought to provide a brief overview of Hart’s 
major claims, the rule of recognition, and its broader place in Hart’s model 
of law.  In the next section, I shall use specific historical episodes – that is, 
specific legislative and judicial debates – from the Chinese legal tradition 
as a non-Western and historical litmus test for many of the claims Hart made 
regarding the rule of recognition. 
 
II. APPLYING HART’S RULE OF RECOGNITION TO THE CHINESE LEGAL 
TRADITION 
 
In this section, I apply Hart’s rule of recognition, as summarized in the 
preceding section, to the Chinese legal tradition.  I argue that Hart’s rule of 
recognition concept fits, and I will attempt to formulate a working rule of 
recognition for the Chinese legal tradition.  As described in the previous 
section, Hart’s rule of recognition should be understood as an overarching 
 
 
83 Id. at 96.   
84 See, e.g., THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Matthew D. Adler & 
Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (a collection of essays that apply Hart’s rule of recognition and theory 
of law to the contemporary US legal system); A.M. Honore, Real Laws, in LAW, MORALITY, AND 
SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 99, 99-118 (P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz eds., 1977) 
(applying Hart’s theory of law to European statutes); RICHARD S. KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 
AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW (2014) (applying Hart’s theory of law to the 17th-century English 
Glorious Revolution); Gerald Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 588-622 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002) (criticizing Hart’s positivist account of law by applying it to English common law); A.W.B. 
SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 359, 359-382 (1987) (also applying Hart’s theory to 
English common law and arguing Hart’s theory does not fit); William C. Starr, Hart’s Rule of 
Recognition and the E.E.C., 28 N. IRELAND L. Q. 258, 258-268 (1977) (applying Hart’s rule of 
recognition to transnational legal developments in the European Economic Communtiy); Kent 
Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 627, 621-671 (1987) (the 
first scholarly effort to set forth a rule of recognition for the United States – “Whatever the Constitution 
contains, the present legal authority of which does not depend on enactment by a procedure prescribed 
in the Constitution, is law”); and Carey, supra note 20, at 1161-1197. 
85 For exceptions, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.   
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rule of recognition, an array of ranked norms and elements for determining 
legal validity that can accommodate officials’ disagreement over certain 
elements, lesser criteria, or understandings of particular details of the rule 
of recognition. In the Chinese legal tradition, the highest ranked norm in the 
overarching rule of recognition could be articulated as “whatever the 
Emperor enacts, decides, and/or decrees is law.”  This is accurate because 
through Chinese legal history, the emperor had all executive, legislative, 
and judicial power, and because there was no concept of separation of 
powers in traditional China; the emperor enjoyed ultimate authority as the 
supreme lawmaker and adjudicator.86  He was above the law.  In a sense, 
this highest ranked norm in the overarching rule of recognition is akin to 
Hart’s example of “whatever Rex I enacts is law.”87  In the Chinese legal 
tradition, all officials were accountable to the emperor. 
The existence of this highest norm in the rule of recognition was made 
plain by Du Zhou (? – 95 B.C.), a chief judge during the reign of Emperor 
Wu (reign years 141 B.C. – 87 B.C.) of the Han dynasty.  Du Zhou was 
quite a cruel official and, in implementing the law and deciding cases, he 
ignored written law and simply followed the whims of the emperor.88  
Whomever the emperor wanted to get rid of, Du Zhou would find a way to 
frame or entrap him.  Whenever the emperor wanted to pardon or forgive 
someone, Du Zhou would find a way to make that happen.89  At one point, 
one of Du Zhou’s guests directly criticized him, saying, “When you help the 
emperor adjudicate cases, you do not follow the established laws.  You only 
follow the emperor’s wishes and desires.”90  In his reply, Du Zhou said: 
“Whence comes the law?  What was desired by a former ruler became 
statutes; those by a later one are made substatutes.  Law is thus nothing but 
that which is approved by a ruler . . . .”91   To Du Zhou (whom we might 
 
 
86 MACCORMACK, supra note 18, at 18. 
87 HART, supra note 1, at 96.   
88 BAN GU, HAN SHU [THE BOOK OF HAN, also known as HISTORY OF THE FORMER HAN] 60.2659 
(Taipei Dingwen Book Co. ed., 1986).  The Book of Han was written in the first century A.D. and is part 
of the dynastic histories, or official histories, known in Chinese as the zheng shi.  The preservation of 
the past and the writing of history have both been very serious enterprises in Chinese civilization.  
Among the most important historical works that were produced are these twenty-four zheng shi.  They 
cover important events, people, and institutions of the various dynasties.  One dynasty’s history was 
usually written by the dynasty that followed it.  The Book of Han covers the history of China from 206 
B.C. to 25 A.D.  The zheng shi are, generally speaking, the most important written primary source for 
the study of China’s imperial dynasties.  Norman P. Ho, Confucian Jurisprudence in Practice: Pre-Tang 
Dynasty Panwen (Written Legal Judgments), 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 48, 76 n.97 (2013).   
89 BAN GU, supra note 88, at 60.2659. 
90 Id. 
91 Quoted in WEJEN CHANG, IN SEARCH OF THE WAY: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE CLASSIC 
CHINESE THINKERS 477 (2016).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
200 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 10:183 
 
 
describe as one of the most exclusive positivists in the Chinese legal 
tradition), the highest-ranked norm of “whatever the emperor enacts, 
decides, and/or decrees is law” would be the only element in the rule of 
recognition.  In other words, for Du Zhou, law-ascertaining decisions would 
simply have to conform to this norm – we just care about a primary rule’s 
pedigree (whether it originated from the emperor or not). 
However, we cannot end the Article and stop at Du Zhou’s formulation 
of the rule of recognition, because his simplistic formulation does not 
adequately reflect law in practice in the Chinese legal tradition.  Despite the 
emperor being at the top of the Chinese traditional legal system, in practice, 
emperors acted on the advice of their officials,92 and they were also subject 
to several limitations on their authority, such as prevailing Confucian ethical 
standards, tradition (e.g., historical precedents and decisions by wise 
emperors before them), Confucian classics and the principles contained 
therein, as well as cosmological and natural principles.  Furthermore, what 
emperors wanted did not always become law.93  Now that we have set forth 
the highest ranked criteria of the rule of recognition (i.e., “whatever the 
emperor enacts, decides and/or decrees is law”), what are the lower criteria 
of the rule of recognition, and how are they ranked “in relative subordination 
and primacy,”94 with this highest-ranked criteria and norm that comprises 
the overarching, unified rule of recognition?   
To identify these lower criteria, the analysis must leave the realm of the 
abstract and enter the realm of the empirical. This article now turns to actual 
legal and legislative debates and cases from Chinese legal history to gain a 
better understanding of the rule of recognition in action.   
 
A. The Wang Wang Case 
We begin first with a case from the reign of Emperor Ming (reign 
58-75 A.D.) of the Han dynasty.  The case concerned the actions of an 
official named Wang Wang.  During his tenure as a provincial regional 
inspector, his jurisdiction experienced a punishing drought which left many 
common people poor and hungry.95  As he was inspecting the area, he saw 
hundreds of people naked and starving, trying to find food in vegetation.96  
Wang felt immense sorrow, and he distributed millet and cloth to the people, 
and afterwards, sent an official report to Emperor Ming to let him know 
 
 
92 MACCORMACK, supra note 18, at 162 
93 CHANG, supra note 91, at 477. 
94 HART, supra note 1, at 101. 
95 SARAH QUEEN, FROM CHRONICLE TO CANON: THE HERMENEUTICS OF THE SPRING AND 
AUTUMN, ACCORDING TO TUNG CHUNG-SHU  171 (1996). 
96 Id. 
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what he had done.97  Emperor Ming wanted to punish Wang, because Wang 
had not first sent a document requesting imperial permission to issue the 
millet and cloth.98  This emperor’s decision to punish Wang was sent down 
to various officials for their deliberation and advice.99  A group of officials 
decided that Emperor Ming was correct because Wang had broken the law 
and was guilty of the crime of “giving orders without authorization.”100 This 
group of officials also said that “the laws contained constant stipulations” 
on such a crime.101  For them, the case was simple: Wang should be 
punished because the law prohibited “giving orders without authorization,” 
he had broken this law, and Emperor Ming wanted him punished.  Another 
official also agreed Wang had broken the letter of the law, but he issued a 
dissenting opinion, arguing that the punishment should not be what is 
provided under the law: 
 
In antiquity, [as recorded by the Spring and Autumn Annals], Hua 
Yuan and Zifan, two good ministers from the states of Song and 
Chu, did not follow the commands of their lords and, acting on 
their personal discretion, brought peace to their two states.  It is a 
righteous principle of the Spring and Autumn Annals to consider 
one’s virtues when discussing such cases.  Now, with his thoughts 
on righteousness, Wang Wang forgot his crime.  Faced with [an 
opportunity to practice] humaneness, he did not yield.  If you were 
to correct him by means of the law, you would ignore his original 
sentiments, and thwart the sagely court’s precept of loving and 
nurturing [the people].102 
 
The dissenting official above supported, in essence, setting aside the 
requirements of a statutory law, its mandated punishment, and the emperor’s 
desire and instead following certain principles from the Spring and Autumn 
Annals, a Confucian classic103 which was thought to contain important 
 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 The Confucian Classics were among the most important texts in all of premodern Chinese 
history; they formed the basis of education and were used as guides for daily behavior and local and 
national governance.  Under the administration of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (156-87 B.C.), 
Confucianism was made the official, orthodox state doctrine.  Throughout Chinese history, numerous 
texts were added to the canon known today as the Confucian Classics, which grew to thirteen classics in 
the Song dynasty.  Confucius himself referred to the Six classics (the Classic of Poetry the Book of 
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political, ethical, and historical lessons from Confucius.104  To support his 
position, he cited a historical precedent of two righteous ministers from the 
Spring and Autumn Annals who also took their own initiative to act and 
achieved good results, but also a general principle in the Spring and Autumn 
Annals in order to “consider one’s virtues when discussing such cases.”  He 
also brought up a general principle of an emperor’s rule for “loving and 
nurturing [the people].”  As indicated by his written opinion, the rule of 
recognition for this dissenting official is more complex than simply 
containing the criteria of “whatever the emperor enacts, decides, and/or 
decrees, is law.”  That is still the highest-ranked criteria – for, after all, the 
dissenting official is trying to persuade the emperor to reach what he sees 
as the correct decision – but we see general ethical principles (“loving and 
nurturing the people”), authoritative texts (The Spring and Autumn Annals), 
and historical precedents also being used as lower-level criteria in a law-
ascertaining activity.  It is not clear, however, how they are ranked relative 
to each other in the mind of the dissenting official, and under Hart’s model, 
it is not necessary to know the precise ranking because the rule of 
recognition may contain some indeterminacy especially at the lower-level 
criteria.  However, it appears that the Spring and Autumn Annals was key 
in his judgment as an important criterion in determining legal validity.105 
Furthermore, we see a disagreement between the dissenting official and the 
majority group of officials in that the latter did not seem to consider other 
 
 
Documents, The Book of Rites, The Book of Change, the Spring-Autumn Annals, and the Classic of 
Music.  The Classic of Music was lost when the first emperor of the Qin dynasty ordered the infamous 
burning of the books; the remaining five texts were collectively known as the Five Classics in the early 
Han dynasty.  Later on in the Eastern Han dynasty (25-220 A.D.), two more texts were added (the Classic 
of Filial Piety and the Analects) to create the Seven Classics.  In the Tang dynasty, the number rose to 
twelve, until the Song, which with the addition of the Mencius, brought the total to thirteen.  Ho, supra 
note 88, at 54-55 n.25.  For more discussion, see ENDYMION WILKINSON, CHINESE HISTORY: A 
MANUAL 475-476 (2000). 
104 The Spring and Autumn Annals is essentially a history of the twelve dukes of the ancient Chinese 
state of Lu from roughly 722 to 481 B.C. Its structure is akin to that of a historical outline or timeline, 
reporting facts in a chronological, pithy order. Authorship was traditionally attributed to Confucius. 
Because of the terse nature of the Spring and Autumn Annals, some authors wrote commentaries to 
expound and explain certain events and personages in the Spring and Autumn Annals. The Zuozhuan is 
one such commentary and is regarded as the earliest work of narrative history in China. Its authorship 
has been traditionally attributed to Zuo Qiuming, a writer that lived in the fifth century B.C. in Lu. It 
runs chronologically parallel with the Spring and Autumn Annals and expounds on numerous events and 
is filled with rich accounts and stories. Some scholars in China now believe the Zuozhuan should be 
understood not as a commentary to Spring and Autumn Annals, but rather as a free-standing work that 
was later inserted into the Spring and Autumn Annals. The Zuozhuan is thought to date to the late fourth-
century B.C.; it is considered one of the most important primary sources for the period as it augments 
the basic information provided in the Spring and Autumn Annals. The Gongyang is another commentary 
on the Spring and Autumn Annals. Authorship for has traditionally been attributed to Gongyang Gao, 
who was a disciple of Zixia (himself a disciple of Confucius).  Ho, supra note 88, at 63-64.   
105 Indeed, the practice of using the Spring and Autumn Annals to decide legal cases (named 
Chunqiu jueyu in Chinese) emerged in the Han dynasty.  For further discussion of this practice, see id. 
at 78-108. 
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criteria other than what the emperor desired and the law that the emperor 
passed.  Yet, as discussed in the preceding section, Hart’s model can 
accommodate such disagreements because they all fundamentally agree that 
it is the emperor and what the emperor does that comprises the highest-
ranked norm of the rule of recognition.  In the end, the historical record tells 
us that Emperor Ming was moved by the dissenting official’s argument and 
pardoned Wang Wang.106  Thus, legal validity is ultimately still determined 
by the emperor, who rests at the top of the rule of recognition criteria, but 
from this case we also see authoritative Confucian texts like the Spring and 
Autumn Annals, general ethical principles, and historical precedents as 
comprising lower-level criteria in the overarching rule of recognition. 
 
B. The Debate over “The Law on Leniency for Insult Killings” 
 The debate over “The Law on Leniency for Insult Killings” concerned 
a secondary rule which granted leniency and reduction of penalties for 
revenge killings, also in the Han dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.).  To give 
some historical context, during the period of Emperor Zhang (reign 75-88 
A.D.), there was a man who insulted a father.  The son of the insulted father 
killed the insulter in revenge.  The son was sentenced to death for murder, 
pursuant to Han dynasty legal prohibitions on murder, but Emperor Zhang 
commuted his death sentence and issued an imperial edict which pardoned 
him.  From that point forward, Emperor Zhang’s actions were considered a 
legal precedent and eventually the leniency for insult revenge killings 
became a law called “The Law on Leniency for Insult Killings (Qing wu 
fa).”107  A few years later in the reign of Emperor He of the Han dynasty 
(reign 88-105 A.D.), his prime minister, Zhang Min, argued against this law, 
submitting a total of two memorials to Emperor He.  He stated the following 
in his first memorial to Emperor He: 
 
With respect to the “Leniency for Insult Killings” Law, it should 
be remembered that the ancient sage kings never codified their 
benevolence and grace into statutory law and promulgate it.  
Matters of life and death should be decided in accordance with 
examples and norms from antiquity and the present-day, just like 
 
 
106 Queen, supra note 95. 
107 FAN YE, HOU HAN SHU [THE HISTORY OF THE LATER HAN] 44.1502-1503 (Taipei Dingwen 
Book Co. ed., 1981).  The History of the Later Han is also one of the official dynastic histories, and it 
was written in the mid-fifth century A.D.  It covers the history of the Eastern Han from roughly 25 to 
220 A.D.   
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there are four seasons and cycles of growth and death.  If we begin 
start to just exercising leniency and forgiveness and codify that into 
law, then we are effectively planting the seeds of evil and abetting 
criminal behavior.  Confucius said, “The common people can be 
made to follow it, but they cannot be made to understand it.”108  
According to the great principles of the Spring and Autumn Annals, 
if a son doesn’t avenge his father, then he does not deserve to be 
called a son of his father.  But the reason why this law should not 
be conferring leniency is because we can’t be advocating mutual 
killing.  Now, killers who are justifying their crime on morality 
(e.g., avenging insults) enjoy reductions of punishments while 
those who kill for no particular reason are prosecuted differently. 
This is allowing officials tasked with implementing the law to 
manipulate the law and situation.  This is not the proper way to 
teach the principle of “similar situations should not be treated 
differently.”  Precedents applying the “Leniency for Insult 
Killings’ Law” have steadily grown in number, and there are now 
almost 400-500 precedents on record . . . I have heard my teacher 
say: “There is nothing better than simplicity and plainness to save 
[a piece of writing] from over-embellishment and excessive 
verbosity.”  As a result, Emperor Gaozu of the Han (202-195 BC) 
did away with the superfluous and cruel laws and regulations, and 
instead set forth basic, simple rules to be observed . . . .109 
 
His first memorial was ignored and set aside, and so Zhang Min wrote and 
submitted another one: 
 
Confucius transmitted the classics, and Gao Yao110 set down a law 
code.  Their purpose was to prevent the people from doing bad 
things.  I do not know how “Leniency for Insult Killings Law” 
serves this purpose.  We definitely must not have situations where 
people are not respectful to each other, but then they take a path of 
killing and murder. And, in the meantime, [due to the law], officials 
pardon and forgive their evil and wretched ways.  One individual 
in the discussion said, “a fair law must first take into account the 
interests of living people.”  I believe that the most important part 
 
 
108 CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM TRADITIONAL COMMENTARIES 81 (Edward 
Slingerland trans., Hackett, 2003) (quoting from Confucius’s Analects 8.9). 
109 FAN YE, supra note 107, at 44.1503.  All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated. 
110 Gao Yao, who lived in the 21st century B.C., was an important legal and political adviser to the 
Xia dynasty sage kings, Shun and Yu the Great.  During Shun’s administration, Gao Yao served as 
minister of justice and was thus the leading legal official in the realm.  Ho, supra note 88, at 68 n.70.   
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of the nature of heaven and earth (i.e., the universe), is human life.  
Murderers should be put to death – this is the system of the Three 
Dynasties of Antiquity (Xia, Shang, and Zhou).  If today we want 
to protect human lives, but yet [through this law] open up the road 
to legitimizing murder, then the harm, won’t be simply just the one 
victim, but every human being on earth will be harmed.  I 
remember it was said, “When one person is profited but 100 are 
hurt, people will leave this city.”  . . . .  In spring, if something is 
declining or drying out, then that indicates there is a disaster.  In 
autumn, when something is flourishing excessively, that is strange. 
The emperor acts in accordance with the nature of Heaven and 
Earth, and he should follow the cycle of the four seasons, and he 
should follow the classic legal norms.  I hope your majesty keeps 
the people’s interests at heart, [and] consider pros and cons . . .111   
 
In the end, Emperor He followed Zhang Min’s suggestions and abolished 
the “Law on Leniency for Insult Killings.”112 
 Using this legislative debate as a testing ground for Hart’s theory, the 
main issue is surrounding the secondary rule that is the “Law on Leniency 
for Insult Killings.”  Specifically, this law is a secondary rule of 
adjudication, because it provides for leniency and reduction of punishment 
for individuals who have committed murder, but for the purpose of avenging 
insults toward their fathers.  The issue Zhang Min addressed was whether 
this secondary rule fulfilled the criterion of legal validity set out in the rule 
of recognition. If it did not fulfill the criterion, it did not enjoy the status of 
a true law and should be abolished or set aside.  Zhang Min argued for this 
law’s abrogation.  How does Hart’s rule of recognition model fit in?  It is 
apparent from both memorials that Zhang Min, like the officials in the Wang 
Wang case above, considered the highest element or criteria in the rule of 
recognition as “whatever the emperor enacts, decides, and/or decrees, is 
law,” because again, with no separation of powers, Zhang Min’s goal was 
to persuade the emperor to change the law, since the emperor ultimately 
made the law (indeed, Zhang Min addressed his memorial to the emperor, 
attempting to persuade him: “I hope your majesty . . .”).  However, Zhang 
Min also considered other lower-level criteria in ascertaining whether the 
“Law on Leniency for Insult Killings” was truly valid.  He referred to 
various sources of legal authority: first, he brought up historical practices 
 
 
111 FAN YE, supra note 107, at 44.1503. 
112 Id. 
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and precedents, arguing that as a historical matter, the ancient sage kings 
took a very cautious approach to codification generally, as did Emperor 
Gaozu, the founding emperor of the Han dynasty.  His point seems to be 
that these model leaders would not have codified leniency for insult killings 
into the law.  He also cited the examples of the Three Dynasties of 
Antiquity, a golden period in Chinese history, as periods where murderers 
were put to death (and hence, Emperor He should also follow their 
practices).  Second, he brought up specific, morally upright figures from 
Chinese history.  For example, he brought up Confucius, who Zhang Ming 
quoted also to support the idea that some things should not be codified 
because the common people will not understand some written laws anyway, 
and it is up to the leader to guide them from above.  Zhang Min also brought 
up Gao Yao, reminding Emperor He that Gao Yao set down law codes that 
prevented evil, the opposite effect of the “Leniency for Insult Killings” law.  
In addition, like the dissenting official in the Wang Wang case, Zhang Min 
also appealed to general moral and ethical principles and more explicitly 
tied them to the cosmos, e.g., Zhang Min argued that the principle of the 
inherent value and sanctity of human life should be respected, that the 
interests of living people must be prioritized, and hence a law which spared 
murderers from heavy punishment would not fulfill these principles.  By 
tying these principles to the nature of “Heaven and Earth,” Zhang Min also 
reminded the emperor of his responsibilities to the entire world and cosmos. 
 There is an area where Zhang Min’s recommendation differs from the 
dissenting official in Wang Wang’s case.  The latter emphasized the Spring 
and Autumn Annals as a key norm in the rule of recognition.  However, 
Zhang Min here consciously sets aside the Spring and Autumn Annals.  He 
admitted that it would uphold the right of a son to kill to avenge his father, 
but dismisses it, ranking the principle of the sanctity of human life (and 
avoiding and discouraging murder) as being ranked higher.  Thus, we can 
say that based on the memorials above, Zhang Min ranked the criteria of 
authoritative texts like the Spring and Autumn Annals lower than general 
ethical principles, historical precedents and practices, and the wisdom of 
outstanding individuals in Chinese history.  But again, it is not clear exactly 
how he would rank these vis-a-vis each other.  And, for Hart’s theory to 
work, Zhang Min does not have to, given the open textured nature of the 
rule of recognition. 
 
 
C. The Debate Over the Law Prohibiting Sons from Reporting 
their Mother’s Murdering their Father 
 The final empirical example to be discussed and analyzed in this 
section is a legislative debate between two officials, Dou Yuan and Feng 
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Junyi, concerning a primary rule, which occurred in the Eastern Wei period 
of Emperor Xiaojing (524-555 A.D).  The debate concerned a law  that 
prohibited a son from informing on his mother if she killed his father (and 
if he did, he would be executed).113  Dou Yuan submitted a memorial to the 
throne, arguing that the existing law did not make sense.  His final point was 
that sons should be allowed to report his mother for killing his father; to not 
allow the son to do this would be to debase the father’s status and be 
barbaric.114  He also reasoned that under current norms, if the father killed 
the mother, the son could refrain from reporting his father for the crime 
(although if his father had committed an especially serious offense, such as 
traitorous or seditious offenses, then the son could report on his father).115  
Dou Yuan’s call to abolish this primary rule spawned quote a bit of debate 
in court.  The central legal question addressed in the course of the debate 
was whether or not the primary rule of prohibiting sons from reporting on 
their mother’s murdering their fathers is valid.  I shall provide full 
translations of the debate, since to my knowledge such translations have not 
been previously made available, and then I shall apply Hart’s theory to the 
debate. 
Feng Junyi opposed Dou Yuan and argued: 
 
We get our bodies, hair, and skin from our parents.  They have 
expended so much to give birth to us . . . the breaths children take 
are different from their parents but the blood is the same; it is so 
hard for children their entire life to properly and rightfully repay 
their parents . . . Today, we have suddenly started to discuss the 
nobility and baseness and the goodness or evil of our parents.  From 
our hearts, it would be hard for us to admit [to bad behavior by our 
parents]; nor can we get clear answers from historical and classical 
texts.  If a mother killed her husband and the child reported his 
mother, leading directly to her execution, this would be the same 
as a child killing his mother.  In this world, there are no countries 
without mothers.  I do not know where such children would go 
[after reporting]!  The Spring and Autumn Annals did not proclaim 
 
 
113 Ho, supra note 88, at 104. In Chinese legal history, laws often provided for family members to 
conceal crimes of other family members.  The foundational philosophical and moral basis for such laws 
was a statement in Confucius’s Analects: “ . . . fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for 
their fathers.  ‘Uprightness’ is to be found in this.”  See Confucius’s Analects 13.18.  Slingerland, supra 
note 108, at 147. 
114 Ho, supra note 88, at 104. 
115 Id. 
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that Lord Zhuang (693 B.C.-662 B.C.)116 acceded  to the throne, 
because his mother, Wen Jiang, was abroad.  Fu Qian117 further 
elucidated (on this event): Wen Jiang had plotted with the Prince 
of Qi (her brother), and they together murdered Lord Huan (Lord 
Zhuang’s father) and did not return.  Lord Zhuang covered up his 
father’s murder and kept the emotional pain of his father’s death 
bottled up inside.  During the mourning period for his father, Lord 
Zhuang deeply mourned and stood in tribute.  After some time, 
such feelings moderated, and he began to miss and think of his 
mother.  Thus, the annals portion says: “in the third month, the wife 
of Lord Huan retired to Qi.”  Since we have this story and historical 
proof of a child who hid his mother’s crime and yet still missed her 
[affectionately], we can see that a child does not bear grudges 
against his mother and a desire to vengefully report her.  The 
ancient sages created this law in order to prevent despicable and 
tumultuous acts of violence . . . and to let people understand evil 
and to avoid breaking the law.  If we were to start over again and 
discuss [and revise] this law, the people who would retroactively 
be found to have broken the law would number far too many.  The 
most severe and evil crime would be to kill one’s father or to harm 
one’s ruler.  Such principles have been written into the law, and 
hundreds of generations of kings have not changed this.  Since the 
rules on reporting do not go against these principles, and since these 
rules have not caused any harm and have also been in effect for so 
long, I do not think we should change them [and adopt Dou Yuan’s 
proposal].”118 
Again, it is important to first remember that both Dou Yuan and Feng Junyi 
both were addressing their remarks to the ruler.  The ultimate criterion in 
the rule of recognition, which both agreed on, is that legal validity is 
ultimately determined with reference to what the emperor enacts, decides, 
and/or desires.  However, neither Dou nor Feng simply ascertained the legal 
validity of the primary rule with reference solely to the emperor’s actions.  
The rule of recognition is more complicated than this.  In his attack on Dou’s 
 
 
116 Lord Zhuang came to power after his father, Lord Huan, had been murdered as a result of an 
affair between Wen Jiang (Lord Zhuang’s mother) and her own brother, the Prince of Qi.  Usually, for 
other rules of the state of Lu, the Spring and Autumn Annals would have a passage that explicitly 
proclaimed that the new lord had ascended to the throne.  However, for Lord Zhuang, there was no such 
explicit passage. 
117 Fu Qian was a prominent Han Confucian scholar and commentator on texts and a colleague of 
fellow influential commentator Zheng Xuan (127-200 A.D.).  See Ho, supra note 88, at 107 n.172.   
118 WEI SHOU, WEISHU [BOOK OF THE WEI] 88.1908-1910 (Taipei Dingwen Book Co. ed, 1980).  
The Weishu is one of the dynastic histories; it covers the Northern and Eastern Wei from about 386 to 
550 AD.  It was written in the sixth century A.D.  I have slightly modified my translation which appeared 
originally in Ho, supra note 88, at 107-108. 
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proposal, we see Feng referring to lower-level elements and norms in the 
internal hierarchy of the overarching rule of recognition, including elements 
we have not previously seen.  Feng referred to moral and ethical standards, 
such as the important relationship between mother and son, the importance 
of mothers to a society, and compared the abolishment of the law to the 
moral wrong of sons killing their mothers.  He also referred to historical 
precedents and practices, namely the ancient sage kings, who he credited 
with originally creating this law, as well as the “hundreds of generations of 
kings” who have kept the law intact.  In addition, he brought up authoritative 
texts, namely, the Spring and Autumn Annals, and specifically the Lord 
Zhuang story. What we have not seen in previous examples, however, is 
Feng’s consideration of a commentator/interpreter (Fu Qian) as a criteria, in 
order to make sense of what exactly the Spring and Autumn Annals says.  
Obviously, the Spring and Autumn Annals text itself would be ranked higher 
in the hierarchy of criteria within the rule of recognition than the 
commentator.  But because the Spring and Autumn Annals merely states that 
Lord Zhuang’s accession was not proclaimed because his mother was 
abroad, Feng referred to Fu’s interpretation to show that in the Spring and 
Autumn Annals, Lord Zhuang did not bear grudges against his mother and 
did not possess a desire to vengefully report her.   
Dou Yuan then retorted, breaking down Feng Junyi’s arguments into 
three parts: 
 
Feng Junyi has argued that “the breaths children take are different 
from their parents but the blood is the same; it is so hard for 
children their entire life to properly and rightfully repay their 
parents . . . Today, we have suddenly started to discuss the nobility 
and baseness and the goodness or evil of our parents.  From our 
hearts, it would be hard for us to admit [to bad behavior by our 
parents]; nor can we get answers from historical and classic 
texts.”   
I think the Book of Changes119 was quite clear: “Heaven is lofty and 
honourable; earth is low. (Their symbols), Qian and Kun, (with 
their respective meanings), were determined (in accordance with 
this).”120  The Book of Changes also said: “Qian is (the symbol of) 
 
 
119 The Book of Changes was one of the Confucian classics.  Its structure is basically that of a 
divination manual and was interpreted as showing correspondences between the natural world and the 
cosmos.    
120 I use James Legge’s translation of this passage from the Book of Changes.  16 SACRED BOOKS 
OF THE EAST (James Legge trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1899), available at www.ctext.org/book-of-
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heaven, and hence has the appellation of father. Kun is (the symbol 
of) earth, and hence has the appellation of mother.”121  The Book of 
Changes also says, “Qian suggests the idea of a heaven, . . .  of a 
father,” and Kun suggests the idea of earth, . . . of a mother.”122  
The Book of Rites says: “the sackcloth with jagged edges is worn 
for the father for three years;  [Hence, while the father is alive], the 
sackcloth with even edges is worn (for a mother), (and only) for a 
year.”123  The nobility and baseness, as well as the superiority and 
inferiority, of the mother and father are clearly stated in the 
passages of the Classics.  How can it be said that there are no 
answers from the ancient texts?124 
 
Dou Yuan took issue with Feng’s assertion that there were no clear answers 
from classic texts.  Dou quoted passages from Book of Changes which he 
believed proved that it is natural, and in alignment with the natural and 
cosmological world, that a father is superior to a mother.  Applying Hart’s 
theory, we see Dou referring to the criteria of authoritative texts in 
determining legal validity, although it is not clear how Dou would himself 
rank one particular Confucian classic with another.  We can also read Dou’s 
response as disagreement with Feng over which authoritative text is higher-
ranked as a criteria for determining legal validity – Book of Changes or the 
Spring and Autumn Annals. Yet, these are lower-level disagreements or 
ambiguities that do not affect the unity of the rule of recognition. 
 
Feng Junyi has also argued that “If a mother killed her husband and 
the child reported his mother, leading directly to her execution, this 
would be the same as a child killing his mother.  In this world, there 
are no countries without mothers.  I do not know where such 
children would go [after reporting]!”   
I have looked at the legal codes and cases, and I have never heard 
of a situation where a son has concealed his mother’s murder of his 
father.  If a son conceals his mother’s crime, this is equivalent to 
participating in the murder of his father.  In this world, how can 
there be countries without fathers?  For sons who do not report their 
mother’s murder of their fathers, I also do not know where they 
 
 
changes/xi-ci-shang.  
121 Id. at www.ctext.org/book-of-changes/shuo-gua.  
122 Id. 
123 The Book of Rites is another Confucian classic.  For much of Chinese history, it was thought to 
be compiled by Confucius.  It describes the government system and rites of the Zhou dynasty. I use 
James Legge’s translation of this passage. 28 Sacred Books of the East (James Legge trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1885), available at ctext.org/liji/sang-fu-si-zhi.   
124 WEI SHOU, supra note 118, at 88.1910-1911. 
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would go!”125   
 
Here, Dou referred also to the criteria of historical precedents and practices, 
arguing that he has never heard of situations in previous legal codes or cases 
where a son concealed the mother’s murdering of his father.  He disagreed 
with Feng’s reference to the “generations of kings.”  Furthermore, he also 
brought up general ethical and moral principles himself, arguing that fathers 
are equally important as mothers (and perhaps more so).  Thus, we see that 
Dou agreed with Feng that the overarching rule of recognition contains 
norms on historical precedents, authoritative texts, and general principles, 
but he disagreed with Feng as to which precedents, texts, and principles are 
prime.  But again, Hart’s overall model still fits, because these points of 
contention involve less important layers of the rule of recognition. 
Feng Junyi has also argued: “Per the Spring and Autumn Annals, The 
Spring and Autumn Annals did not proclaim that Lord Zhuang (693-662 
BC) acceded to the throne, because his mother, Wen Jiang, was abroad.  Fu 
Qian,, colleague of Zheng Xuan (127-200 AD) further elucidated (on this 
event): Wen Jiang had plotted with the Prince of Qi (her brother), and they 
together murdered Lord Huan (Lord Zhuang’s father) and did not return .  
Lord Zhuang covered up his father’s murder and kept the emotional pain of 
his father’s death bottled up inside..  During the mourning period for his 
father, Lord Zhuang deeply mourned and stood in tribute.  After some time, 
such feelings moderated, and he began to miss and think of his mother.  
Thus, the annals portion says: “in the third month, the wife of Lord Huan 
retired to Qi.”  Since we have this story and historical proof of a child who 
hid his mother’s crime and yet still missed her [affectionately], we can see 
that a child does not bear grudges against his mother and a desire to 
vengefully report her.”  I have looked into Feng’s annotations and 
explanations of the event.  The reason why Lord Zhuang kept the emotional 
pain of his father’s death bottled up and concealed is because his father had 
been murdered by Qi, and his mother had taken part in the crime.  The 
reason why Lord Zhuang’s accession was not proclaimed was in order to 
conceal Lord Zhuang’s emotional pain over his father’s death and avoid 
specific mention of his mother’s leaving the state.  It was not in order to 
conceal his mother’s murder of his father.   From this we can conclude that 
Lord Zhuang’s cover-up and concealing was not a cover-up of his mother’s 
murdering his father.126   
 
 
125 Id. at 88.1911. 
126 Id. 
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Dou above began his attack on Feng’s interpretation and use of the 
Spring and Autumn Annals.  Again, this point of contention also concerned 
a lower-ranked layer of the rule of recognition (on a specific authoritative 
text) – the fact that Dou deliberately took the time to comment on the text 
still shows he sees the Spring and Autumn Annals as being part of the rule 
of recognition.  However, in his response, Dou relied on the Gongyang 
commentaries127 (rather than Fu Qian’s commentaries) as a definitive 
interpretation, which said that “When the father-lord is murdered, the son 
does not say he ‘acceded to the throne’; he will instead conceal his 
accession. Dou Yuan clarified that, according to the Gongyang 
commentaries, the reason why Lord Zhuang did not proclaim accession was 
not because he wanted to cover up for his mother, but because of rules 
concerning taboos (e.g., he could not mention his father’s death or his 
mother’s leaving the state).128  Dou Yuan continued: 
 
According to the Gongyang commentary of the Spring and Autumn 
Annals, “when the father-lord is murdered, the son does not say he 
‘acceded to the throne’; he will conceal his accession.”129 [As for 
the points on Lord Zhuang’s mourning and his thinking of his 
mother], this is basically what “the wife of the Lord retired to Qi” 
refer to.  This is in order to avoid the taboo mention of her 
fleeing/leaving the state, and in fact it should be interpreted as 
intending to revealing her sin and crime.  In fact, the Spring and 
Autumn Annals Zuozhuan Commentary130 says: “In the third 
month, the wife of Lord Huan retired to Qi:  It does not proclaim 
her “Lady Jiang” because she had been cut off and was not 
acknowledged as a parent.  This was in accordance with ritual 
propriety.”131 The annotation further indicates that “the wife is 
guilty of conspiracy to murder Lord Huan.  By cutting off relations 
with her and not considering her relative, this is manifesting the 
principle of honoring and respecting your father.”  The Zuozhuan 
 
 
127 For more discussion of the Gongyang and Zuozhuan commentaries to the Spring and Autumn 
Annals, see supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
128 WEI SHOU, supra note 118, at 88.1911-1912. 
129 This quote is from the Lord Zhuang chapter in the Gongyang commentary.  See Chunqiu 
gongyangzhuan [The Gongyang commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals], in DUANJU SHISANJING 
JINGWEN [THE THIRTEEN CHINESE CONFUCIAN CLASSICS: PUNCTUATED] 10 (Taipei Kaiming Book Co. 
ed., 1991). 
130 For more discussion of the Gongyang and Zuozhuan commentaries to the Spring and Autumn 
Annals, see infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
131 This quote is from the Lord Zhuang chapter in the Zuozhuan commentary.  See Chunqiu 
zuozhuan [The Zuozhuan commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals], in DUANJU SHISANJING 
JINGWEN [THE THIRTEEN CHINESE CONFUCIAN CLASSICS: PUNCTUATED] 17 (Taipei Kaiming Book Co. 
ed., 1991).   
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Commentary agrees with Lord Zhuang’s taking into account great 
principles of righteousness and breaking off relations with his 
mother.  Therefore, it said such actions are in accordance with ritual 
propriety.  Taking into account these great principles of 
righteousness and breaking relations with a criminal mother deeply 
manifests the spirit of ritual propriety.  From all this we can see 
justification for reporting on and feeling enmity toward a mother’s 
killing of one’s father.132   
 
Above, Dou Yuan continued his textual debate with Feng Junyi, utilizing 
more criteria – namely, the Zuozhuan commentary – in his law-ascertaining 
exercise, arguing against the legal validity of the law prohibiting sons from 
reporting on mothers who committed mariticide.   Dou Yuan used the 
Zuozhuan as further authority to counter Feng Junyi’s use of Fu Qian’s 
interpretation.  In terms of the hierarchy in the criterion of the rule of 
recognition among The Spring and Autumn Annals, the Gongyang 
Commentary, the Zuozhuan Commentary, and Fu Qian’s commentary, it is 
clear that the Spring and Autumn Annals is at the top (given that it is the 
main Confucian classical text from which spurned explanatory 
commentaries), followed by Gongyang and Zuozhuan (although it’s not 
clear how the Gonyang and Zuozhuan rank relative to each other), and Fu 
Qian is ranked lower or perhaps not even in Dou’s ranking (Dou did not 
even engage with Fu Qian’s interpretations).    
 Dou Yuan finally explained that the reason why Duke Zhuang did not 
make a big deal out of his mother’s mariticide and explicitly report her was 
because of geopolitical concerns at the time.133  During the times of Duke 
Zhuang and his father Lord Huan, Qi was the most powerful state.134  Their 
home state of Lu was small and weak and was afraid of Qi, and the Zhou 
central king was weak and couldn’t be called on for assistance.135  The state 
of Lu did not dare travel to Qi to have an audience with the Qi ruler, so all 
they could do was request the execution of Pengsheng (the Prince of Qi, 
with whom Duke Zhuang’s mother colluded in the mariticide), claiming that 
Lu had been insulted in the eyes of the feudal princes.136  Pengsheng was, 
in the end, executed.137  Dou Yuan ended his argument by saying that the 
 
 
132 WEI SHOU, supra note 118, at 88.1911-1912. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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alternative arguments supporting the primary rule could not persuade him.  
Unfortunately, we do not know what the ruler decided; we only know that 
“the matter was shelved and put aside.”138 
 Both Feng Junyi and Dou Yuan were trying to convince the ruler to 
make a decision whether to keep or abolish the primary rule.  They both 
explicitly accepted the highest ranking criterion in the rule of recognition in 
determining legal validity – whatever the emperor decides or enacts, is law.  
Yet, the rule of recognition they followed was not that simple.  Both relied 
on lower-ranked criteria, including authoritative Confucian texts, notably 
The Spring and Autumn Annals (just like in the Wang Wang case and the 
debate over the “Leniency for Insult Killings Law”).  Where this case differs 
from the Wang Wang case and the insult killings case is that another set of 
criteria is also introduced – the writings of certain commentators to these 
authoritative Confucian texts (e.g., Fu Qian, the Gongyang and Zuozhuan 
commentaries). While they rank lower than the actual authoritative text 
itself, they are important in establishing meaning of cryptic or ambiguous 
passages in the authoritative text.   
 Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition, when understood as an 
overarching, single rule of recognition with an array of norms and criteria 
for law-ascertainment, generally reflects the Chinese legal tradition. The 
rule of recognition for the Chinese legal tradition may be summarized by 
the following statement: What the emperor at the time decides, desires, 
and/or enacts, is law.  What historical precedents, the actions and words of 
historical sages and tradition, authoritative Confucian classics such as the 
Spring and Autumn Annals, the Analects, and the Book of Rites, and 
commentators of such text say or illuminate, also help determine legal 
validity.  Again, based on the examples above, it is not clear how we might 
rank these lower-ranked norms and criteria.  As we have seen, officials 
disagree on their ranking, or even their inclusion.  But again, as we have 
discussed, Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition allows for ambiguity 
given the “open texture” issues related to all rules – a rule of recognition 
sometimes doesn’t provide a clear answer for determining legal validity.  
Furthermore, disagreements on lower-level norms in the hierarchy 
comprising the array of norms in the rule of recognition does cause a 
collapse in the legal system because in the Chinese legal tradition, the 
highest-ranked norm of the emperor’s wishes remained controlling.  No 
official disputed or would dispute that ultimate norm. 
 
 
 
138 Id. 
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D. Does a Rule of Recognition Really Solve Uncertainty in the 
Primary Rules?  Is it Necessary to Solve the Problem of 
Uncertainty? 
 
As discussed earlier in the Article, Hart argues that the purpose of the 
rule of recognition is to solve the problem of uncertainty when there is sole 
reliance on primary rules.  This is because as society gets more complex, 
there may be disagreements over a primary rule, and a society without a rule 
of recognition has no set procedure or methods of interpreting a primary 
rule, determining its scope, or identifying what is or is not a primary rule or 
law.139  The rule of recognition, according to Hart, has the key function of 
solving this problem of uncertainty by specifying “some feature or features 
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as conclusive affirmative 
indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure 
it exerts.”140   In other words, Hart is arguing that without a rule of 
recognition, a society can never really engage in a law-ascertaining exercise 
because it won’t have the means and criteria by which to do so.  
However, Hart’s discussion of the function of the rule of recognition is 
arguably based on a Western-centric assumption that uncertainty and 
ambiguity in primary rules and legal rules more generally is normatively 
undesirable, or at least in Hartian vocabulary “primitive.”  Although Hart 
took great pains to stress that his theory of law is descriptive, and not 
normative (and hence has universal and timeless qualities in application),141 
he does seem to be making a normative judgment when using the terms 
“primitive” to describe societies with only primary rules (and hence will 
have problems of uncertainty at some point with their primary rules), and 
“developed” legal systems to describe societies with primary and secondary 
rules.  The problem with Hart’s analysis is that in a non-Western legal 
tradition such as the Chinese legal tradition, uncertainty and ambiguity in 
law was considered good and desirable.  They were desirable because it was 
believed that people would behave based on ethics and morals.  They would 
take the initiative to be good.  By making laws clear and published, people 
would simply behave in such a way to avoid breaking the laws, and thus the 
people’s strong moral anchor would be weakened.  During the formative 
years of the Chinese legal tradition and also under general Confucian legal 
theory, primary rules were kept, and should be kept, secret from the 
 
 
139 HART, supra note 1, at 92.  For further discussion, see Section I of this Article.   
140 Id. at 94. 
141 Id. at 239.   
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public.142 Making the rules more certain and clear by publishing them was 
perceived as corruptive to society.  This may be difficult to fathom from a 
Western law perspective, which has valued clarity and precision in law.  For 
example, Lon Fuller argued that legitimate legal system required, inter alia, 
that rules be publicized, and that rules are understandable.143   
An example of the Chinese legal tradition’s celebration of uncertainty 
and ambiguity in law, which challenges Hart’s assumptions, is the proposed 
codification of laws in the first Chinese ancient state, the state of Zheng. 
The codification of Zheng’s laws, proposed to promote certainty and clarity 
by casting its laws on bronze vessels in 536 B.C., was severely criticized by 
Shuxiang, a noted official in the Chinese ancient state of Jin.  Shuxiang 
wrote a letter to Zichan, minister of the state of Zheng, criticizing this move:  
Given the importance of this primary source, I have provided a full 
translation of the letter below: 
 
At first, I had great expectations of you, but now, this is not the 
case.  In the past, the ancient kings discussed many quandaries in 
an effort to solve them systematically, but they did not enact penal 
codes, because they were afraid that such an action would cause the 
people to have contentious and quarrelsome hearts.   However, they 
were still not able to control or restrain the people, and so they 
restrained them by instilling within them a sense of duty, bound 
them by means of [good] governance, sent out upon them the 
teachings of ritual propriety, protected them with trust, and 
attended to them with benevolence.  They also set emoluments and 
positions to garner their obedience and levied punishments to 
conquer their excessive behavior.  However, the ancient kings were 
afraid these actions were still insufficient, so they taught them 
loyalty, instilled an awe of authority through their royal actions, 
instructed them as to their duties, employed them with harmony, 
watched over them with respect, administered them with authority, 
and judged them with resolve.  Additionally, they sought out 
sagacious and principled superiors, enlightened and observant 
officials, loyal and honest elders, and kind and gracious teachers.  
As a result, the people could be employed without leading to 
catastrophe.  However, when the people know that there is a written 
legal code, they do not feel respectful awe toward their superiors; 
furthermore, they become contentious and unnecessarily 
 
 
142 JINFAN ZHANG, THE TRADITION AND MODERN TRANSITION OF CHINESE LAW 157 (Zhang Lixin 
et al. trans., Springer, 2014) (1997). 
143 See LON. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
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argumentative, using and resorting to writings and words to 
successfully get what they want.  As a result, they can no longer be 
governed.  When the Xia Dynasty experienced tumult, it created 
the Yu Code.  When the Shang Dynasty experienced tumult, it 
created the Tang Code.  When the Zhou experienced tumult, it 
created the Nine Punishments Code.  All three of these codes 
emerged during the period of the particular dynasty’s downfall.    
Now, as Zheng’s chief minister, you have created dikes and 
ditches, established a government that is vilified, set forth the three 
laws, and [now have] cast the penal codes.  Will it not be very 
difficult to now pacify the people?  The Classic of Poetry says: 
“Take King Wen’s virtue as a standard, pattern, a model / and the 
Four Corners shall be pacified every day.”144  The Classic of Poetry 
also says: “Take King Wen as a pattern, as a model / and the ten 
thousand kingdoms will trust in you.”  Therefore, in this situation, 
why are penal codes even necessary?  Once the people know how 
to argue over specific points of law, they will abandon ritual 
propriety and resort to writings and words.  The people will be 
contentious even at the tip of a chisel or knife.  There will be an 
atmosphere of disorderly litigation and bribery.  Zichan – at the end 
of your time, Zheng might indeed fall.  I have heard that ‘when a 
state is about to fall, it most definitely has many regulations.’ 
Perhaps this refers to Zheng’s current situation?”145   
 
Zichan ultimately did not take Shuxiang’s advice, but as we can see above, 
Shuxiang valued uncertainty and ambiguity.  He argued, using very 
powerful, emotional, and dramatic language, that certainty and ambiguity 
in the law would be disastrous, not just for the people, but for the entire state 
of Zheng, and would not inculcate the people with virtue and loyalty.  Virtue 
and loyalty, in Shuxiang’s eyes, were far better governance tools, because 
internal impetus to do good is a better motivating factor than external 
pressure to avoid committing evil.  The state of Zheng’s actions, besides 
being wrong and catastrophic, was also against tradition and the actions of 
the sage kings.  Uncertainty and ambiguity in law was to be prized and 
promoted. 
 Another example comes from the words of none other than Confucius 
 
 
144 The Classic of Poetry is one of the Confucian classics.  It was believed that Confucius himself 
compiled the poems, selecting them for their moral and literary value.   
145 This is from the Lord Zhao chapter of the Zuozhuan commentary.  Chunqiu zuozhuan, supra 
note 131, at 183-184. 
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himself, who had always expressed a disdain for law and regulation 
(although he admitted that they were necessary for keeping society under 
control).  Some time after Zheng’s casting laws on bronze tripods, ironically 
the state of Jin followed suit, publishing its primary rules (penal law on a 
cauldron).  Confucius was upset and rebuked Shuxiang and the state of Jin, 
using similarly dramatic language against the act: 
 
Jin will collapse.  It has lost its standards.  Jin should follow the 
legal standards received by Shu Yu of Tang . . . in order to govern 
its people, while high ministers and officers, according to their 
ranks, maintain these standards.  Through all of this, the people will 
be able to respect those higher in the hierarchy, and those higher in 
the hierarchy can also do their duties.  When those higher in the 
hierarchy and those lower in the hierarchy do not deviate from their 
roles, that is what is properly called “standards” . . . .  But the state 
of Jin has now abandoned these standards and cast its penal laws 
on a cauldron.  People will focus all their attention on the cauldron 
now.  How will they properly respect those higher in the hierarchy?  
And how can those higher in the hierarchy do their duties?  And, 
when there is no proper distinction between those in a hierarchy, 
how can Jin maintain the integrity of the state?146  
 
Confucius, like Shuxiang, tied clarity and ambiguity in the law to disorder 
and ultimately, the collapse of a state.  It was far preferable in his view to 
lead the people by means of true, ethical understanding.  Rather than arrange 
their affairs or behave in a way as to avoid doing something wrong, they 
would, in a legal system without certainty or knowledge of the rules, seek 
to do good and respect the hierarchies in society. 
 These two above examples from a key, formative period in the Chinese 
legal tradition highlight Hart’s (and other) mistaken, Western-centric 
assumptions about the nature of law.  Thus, Hart’s answer that a rule of 
recognition solves the problem of uncertainty in the primary rules may not 
be fully correct in a legal tradition like China, because uncertainty and in 
fact ambiguity were prized by the Confucian tradition.  In the Chinese legal 
tradition context, we might understand the function of a rule of recognition 
in several different ways, such as a way to increase the efficiency of the 
emperor’s power over the legal and political system. 
 
 
 
 
146 Id. at 229.   
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III. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A TRULY “GENERAL” GENERAL 
JURISPRUDENCE – LESSONS FROM THE CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION 
 
This Article has been an international and historical defense of Hart’s 
theory of law.  It has argued that Hart’s theory of law, and in particular, his 
concept of the rule of recognition, does in fact fit the Chinese legal tradition.  
As the two debates over primary rules (the Wang Wang case and the 
prohibition on sons reporting their mother’s mariticide) and one debate over 
secondary rules (sentencing leniency for insult killers) reveal, the rule of 
recognition in the Chinese legal tradition was a single, overarching rule of 
recognition with a ranked hierarchy of criteria for ascertaining legal 
validity.  At the top of this hierarchy – which the cases and debates show 
that all officials agreed upon – was the idea that whatever the emperor ruling 
at the time decides, desires, and/or enacts, is law.  However, under this 
highest-level criteria were lower-level criteria for determining legal 
validity, including reference to certain authoritative texts (e.g., the Spring 
and Autumn Annals, the Book of Rites, the Book of Changes, and other 
Confucian classics), commentaries and interpreters of these texts (e.g., 
Zuozhuan and Gongyang commentaries, Fu Qian), general moral and 
ethical principles (e.g., loving the people, preserving strong mother-child or 
father-child bonds, upholding human life), authoritative people from history 
(e.g., Confucius, Gao Yao), and historical precedents, actions, and tradition 
more broadly (e.g., the Three Dynasties, worthy and moral ministers, the 
sage kings).  How these lower-level criteria are ranked is not clear, and 
officials often disagreed about their applicability or rank, but such 
disagreements do not destroy the unity of the rule of recognition and do not 
destroy the integrity of the rule of recognition, since no official disagreed 
on the top-ranking criteria that determined legal validity with reference to 
the emperor. 
This Article has also attempted to set forth a rule of recognition for the 
Chinese legal tradition: What the emperor at the time decides, desires, 
and/or enacts, is law.  What historical precedents, the actions and words of 
historical sages and tradition, authoritative Confucian classics such as the 
Spring and Autumn Annals, the Analects, and the Book of Rites, and 
commentators of such text say or illuminate, also help determine legal 
validity. 
This Article has also revealed that although Hart’s concept of the rule 
of recognition generally applies, his argument about the rule of 
recognition’s function – that is, to solve the problem of uncertainty in the 
primary rules – does not seem to apply in the Chinese legal tradition and 
may reflect a Western-centric assumption held by Hart and other Western 
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legal theorists that uncertainty and ambiguity in law is undesirable, or 
characteristic of “primitive” legal systems.  In the Chinese legal tradition, 
uncertainty and ambiguity in primary rules was praised and existed in the 
traditional Chinese legal system alongside the secondary rules.  In other 
words, in the Chinese legal tradition, we might not be able to say the rule of 
recognition solves the problem of uncertainty, because uncertainty was not 
seen as a problem in this tradition. 
Ultimately, applying Hart’s theory to the Chinese legal tradition assists 
in reaching a truly “general” general jurisprudence by revealing the ways 
commonly-held, taken-for-granted assumptions regarding law are incorrect 
(e.g., the notion of uncertainty as undesirable or descriptively speaking, 
“primitive).  It also can help us better reflect upon legal theorists like Hart, 
who were claiming to do descriptive, general jurisprudence.147  The Chinese 
legal tradition can help reveal that perhaps unknown to them, such legal 
theorists were actually making certain normative judgments when they were 
claiming to be descriptive (e.g., that uncertainty is “primitive”), because of 
certain Western-centric notions and views on what they conceive of as a 
“developed” legal system.  Only by exposing and reflecting upon these 
views can we set forth a truly universal and purely descriptive kind of 
jurisprudence.   
 
 
 
 
147 See Hart, supra note 1 at 239-240 (arguing that his aim in The Concept of Law is to provide a 
descriptive theory of law – i.e., one that is “morally neutral” and which “has no justificatory aims . . . .” 
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